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A B S T R A C T
Using a newly developed dataset this paper examines the cyclicality
of private capital inﬂows to low-income developing countries (LIDCs).
The empirical analysis shows that capital inﬂows to LIDCs are
procyclical, yet considerably less procyclical than ﬂows to more ad-
vanced economies. The analysis also suggests that ﬂows to LIDCs
are more persistent than ﬂows to emerging markets (EMs). There
is also evidence that changes in risk aversion are a signiﬁcant cor-
relate of private capital inﬂows with the expected sign, but LIDCs
seem to be less sensitive to changes in global risk aversion than EMs.
A host of robustness checks to alternative estimation methods and
control variables conﬁrm the baseline results. In terms of policy im-
plications, these ﬁndings suggest that private capital inﬂows are likely
to become more procyclical as LIDCs move along the development
path, which could render the conduct of countercyclical monetary
and ﬁscal policies more challenging in these economies.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Starting in the 1990s several low-income developing countries (LIDCs) have experienced a signif-
icant increase in private capital ﬂows (i.e. capital ﬂows excluding oﬃcial development aid and loans).
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Initially, this increase was driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows but by the second half of
the 2000s, several LIDCs were experiencing increased non-FDI private inﬂows (Araujo et al., 2015).
Moreover, inﬂows to a number of these economies started to exhibit similar patterns and character-
istics to inﬂows to emerging markets (EMs). In particular, numerous LIDCs experienced surges in non-
FDI inﬂows in the period 2004–2008, i.e. LIDCs were “catching the wave” of the general increase in
ﬂows to developing countries in that period.
While greater access to international capital markets provides signiﬁcant beneﬁts to LIDCs (for
example through investment and diversiﬁcation opportunities, as well as an avenue for consump-
tion smoothing in face of adverse shocks), it also brings new challenges for ﬁnancial andmacroeconomic
stability. In fact, the empirical literature covering EMs and advanced economies has documented that
international capital ﬂows tend to amplify business cycle ﬂuctuations and might reinforce the adverse
consequences of procyclical policies that still tend to characterize a signiﬁcant number of developing
economies (Frankel et al., 2013; Kaminsky et al., 2005). Procyclical ﬂows also exacerbate the procyclicality
of the domestic banking sector with important implications for ﬁnancial stability.1 Hence, an assess-
ment of the cyclical behavior of private capital ﬂows to LIDCs is of crucial policy relevance.
In this context, it is useful to distinguish conceptually between three different cycles: the domes-
tic business cycle (a staple of macroeconomic analysis); the domestic ﬁnancial cycle (as captured for
example by movements in domestic credit volumes, asset prices, interest rates, etc.); and the global
ﬁnancial cycle (movements in global liquidity, global risk aversion, etc.). The main focus of this paper
is the association between capital inﬂows and the domestic business cycle, although we also discuss
the role of global ﬁnancial cycles. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that there are important link-
ages between these three cycles that have been explored in a burgeoning literature (Obstfeld, 2014;
Lane and McQuade, 2014, among others).
From the perspective of the capital receiving economy, if international capital inﬂows are coun-
tercyclical relative to the domestic business cycle, they could contribute to mitigate macroeconomic
volatility and effectively provide insurance against adverse shocks.2 Nonetheless, if capital inﬂows are
procyclical, they would exacerbate macroeconomic ﬂuctuations as well as amplify the domestic ﬁ-
nancial cycle, potentially contributing to fuel asset price bubbles and unsustainable credit booms.
In this paper, we investigate whether private non-FDI capital ﬂows amplify or dampen economic
cycles in LIDCs and whether the cyclicality of capital ﬂows to these countries differs from the behav-
ior observed for ﬂows to EMs. For these purposes, we explore a new dataset constructed by Araujo
et al. (2015) that overcomes some of the data limitations that tend to characterize capital ﬂows in
LIDCs.
Our main ﬁnding is that while gross private capital inﬂows are procyclical in general, they are less
so in LIDCs relative to EMs. This conclusion is robust to alternative estimation methods and control
variables. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst study to focus on the cyclical properties of gross non-FDI
private capital ﬂows to low-income developing countries using a variety of panel data estimation tech-
niques and control variables. Previous efforts in the literature have documented unconditional correlations
between broader measures of net (rather than gross) ﬂows and the cyclical component of GDP, fo-
cusing on a comparison between OECD economies and emerging markets (Kaminsky et al., 2005) or
have regressed a broad measure of gross capital ﬂows, including FDI and international reserves, on
real GDP growth as well as country dummies and a country speciﬁc trend, but do not include other
control variables (Broner et al., 2013). Another recent strand of the literature has focused on the cross-
sectional dimension of the data (Lane, 2015).
Moreover, our results suggest that ﬂows to LIDCs are also more persistent than ﬂows to EMs. Among
the control variables, changes in risk aversion are a signiﬁcant correlate of private capital ﬂows in most
speciﬁcations with the expected sign. In addition, the evidence also suggests that ﬂows to LIDCs tend
1 See Bruno and Shin (2014) for a practical discussion of the links between capital ﬂows and the procyclicality of the banking
sector. Lane and McQuade (2014) document the empirical links between domestic credit and international capital ﬂows for a
sample of advanced economies and emerging markets.
2 For a theoretical and empirical discussion of the adverse effects of volatility on long-term growth emphasizing the role of
procyclical long-term investment in face of credit constraints, see Aghion et al. (2010).
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to be less sensitive to changes in global risk aversion compared to the full sample. Trade openness
and changes in the terms of trade also present statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for LIDCs.
The results of models using the Blundell–Bond system GMM estimator including external instru-
ments are consistent overall with the ﬁxed-effects regressions. We also follow empirical strategies
that attempt to take into account the consequences of “risk-on/risk-off regimes” driving internation-
al capital ﬂows (Lane, 2015) and the results regarding the procyclicality of ﬂows are similar to the
ones obtained before.
The measurement of cyclical ﬂuctuations in developing countries is challenging. To disentangle tran-
sitory ﬂuctuations around a trend from shocks to trend growth, we also estimate regressions that include
the growth of trend output on the right-hand-side in addition to a measure of the cyclical compo-
nent of GDP. We continue to ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant association between capital inﬂows and
the cyclical component of output. Furthermore, capital inﬂows are also positively associated with trend
growth. But these associations are weaker for LIDCs relative to EMs.
Finally, we also explore whether the results still hold when alternative control and dependent vari-
ables are considered. Notably, the results are robust to alternative variables capturing the level of ﬁnancial
development; as well as to the inclusion of an index measuring ﬁnancial reform. Nevertheless, when
we consider net capital ﬂows the results indicate that they are less related to the cycle than gross ﬂows.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief survey of the theoretical and empir-
ical literature on the cyclicality of capital ﬂows. Section 3 presents the main features of the dataset
constructed by Araujo et al. (2015) and some stylized facts regarding the unconditional (reduced form)
correlation between private capital ﬂows and the cyclical component of output. In Section 4, we discuss
the estimation methodology and variables used in the empirical analysis and Section 5 presents base-
line results. Section 6 presents several robustness checks. Section 7 concludes and discusses some policy
implications of the results.
2. Existing literature
From a theoretical perspective, capital ﬂows could be procyclical, counter-cyclical or even acyclical
depending on the model. In traditional open-economymacro models for endowment economies, where
frictionless access to international capital markets allows for consumption smoothing, net interna-
tional capital ﬂows should be counter-cyclical in response to supply shocks as agents smooth
consumption, i.e. countries would resort to additional international borrowing in face of negative shocks
and would repay their debts during good times (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). Nevertheless, Vegh (2013)
shows that even in a traditional model, capital ﬂows would be procyclical in response to demand shocks
and/or if capital ﬂows cause the domestic business cycle.
Moreover, Gopinath (2005) argues that in open-economy real business cycle models with capital
accumulation, net capital ﬂows, interpreted as the negative of the current account, could be procyclical
or acyclical, depending on two counteracting effects. On the one hand, a transitory positive produc-
tivity shock would cause investment to increase, leading ceteris paribus to a worsening of the current
account and consequently an increase in net capital ﬂows (procyclical response). On the other hand,
the shock would also lead to an increase in savings as agents smooth consumption, thus countering
the investment effect and improving the current account (see Bakus et al., 1992 for a quantitative ex-
ploration with a focus on advanced economies).
Conventional models typically address only the behavior of net ﬂows, but in a recent contribu-
tion, Van Wincoop and Tille (2010) construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
with portfolio choice that permits the analysis of the behavior of gross capital ﬂows at business cycle
frequencies. The model consists of two countries (“Home” and “Foreign”), two goods, and two assets
(claims on “Home” and “Foreign” capital stocks, thus capturing equity-type capital ﬂows). In this model,
capital ﬂows are driven by portfolio growth effects (which are related to increased savings) and port-
folio reallocation effects (which are responses to changes in risk and the expected returns of investments).
Simulations suggest that positive productivity shocks to a country are linked to a reduction in capital
inﬂows. While the “portfolio growth” effect leads to positive outﬂows and negative inﬂows as the pro-
ductivity shock leads to a rise in “Home” savings and a decrease in Foreign savings, the “portfolio
relocation effect” is the one that really dominates capital ﬂow dynamics. At the time of shock, there
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is a retrenchment of capital ﬂows as both Home and Foreign investors reallocate their portfolios toward
their domestic assets, which leads to negative values of both outﬂows and capital inﬂows. Subse-
quently, both Home and Foreign investors reallocate their portfolios toward Foreign equity, leading
to positive capital outﬂows and negative capital inﬂows. Thus, capital inﬂows are expected to be coun-
tercyclical in this model.
The introduction of ﬁnancial frictions could entail procyclical capital ﬂows. Bianchi (2011) shows
that in a DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions and a pecuniary externality, there can be overborrow-
ing in foreign currency in good times, but also sharp adjustments in access to foreign lending in face
of adverse shocks, triggering a Fisherian debt deﬂation mechanism of ampliﬁcation of shocks. More
speciﬁcally, the model features a credit constraint in which creditors restrict loans so that the amount
of debt does not exceed a certain fraction of current tradable income and of current non-tradable income.
Borrowing decisions by decentralized households affect the price of non-tradables and therefore the
credit constraint. When the credit constraint is binding, a reduction in the relative price of non-
traded goods (caused by a negative shock) leads to a large drop in the ability to borrow. Simulations
of the model calibrated to Argentinean data conﬁrm that in the decentralized equilibrium (where the
externality is not addressed) net capital inﬂows are strongly procyclical.
Other approaches focusing on long-term movements of capital ﬂows in extensions of the neoclas-
sical growth model emphasize the importance of productivity differentials between the capital-
receiving country and the global productivity frontier in driving capital inﬂows (Gourinchas and Jeanne,
2013 and Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010). In this context, only countries that are catching-up relative to
the frontier should receive capital inﬂows and faster productivity catch-up should lead to more capital
inﬂows. Nevertheless, the data do not seem to support this prediction. Even if at face value, this mech-
anism would suggest that capital ﬂows are expected to be procyclical, the implications of these models
for the correlation between the cyclical component of GDP and capital inﬂows at business cycle fre-
quencies are not clear-cut.
The procyclicality of net capital ﬂows to emerging markets is a well-documented stylized fact of
the empirical literature. In a seminal paper, Kaminsky et al. (2005) show that the cyclical component
of net capital ﬂows to emerging markets and most OECD economies is positively correlated with the
cyclical component of GDP. More recently, Broner et al. (2013) look at this issue for a broad sample
of advanced economies and emerging markets. Rather than examining simple correlations, they regress
a broad measure of gross capital ﬂows, which includes FDI and international reserves, on real GDP
growth, on country dummies, and on a country speciﬁc trend (country-trend dummies), but do not
include other control variables. They conclude that gross capital inﬂows expand during good times,
while they decline during recessions, thus conﬁrming that gross ﬂows are also procyclical.
Moreover, Puy (2013) using monthly EPFR data for a panel of countries and a Bayesian dynamic
latent factor model that decomposes bond and equity ﬂows into global, regional and country speciﬁc
components ﬁnds that international portfolio investments are highly procyclical relative to global mac-
roeconomic and ﬁnancial conditions (measured by a variety of indicators), but his sample only includes
a handful of LIDCs. His results suggest that portfolio ﬂows by institutional investors act as shock am-
pliﬁers and that both equity and debt ﬂows are procyclical relative to global ﬁnancial conditions. In
addition, this cyclical behavior is present both in advanced and emerging markets, even if procyclicality
is stronger in EMs.
To our knowledge, there are no studies focusing on the cyclical properties of gross capital inﬂows
to LIDCs. Kaminsky et al. (2005) show that the simple unconditional correlation between the cyclical
component of net ﬂows and the cyclical component of GDP is positive and signiﬁcant in LIDCs, but
the correlation coeﬃcient is smaller than for other country groupings. Lane (2015) analyzes the role
of several control variables in explaining the cross-sectional variation of ﬁnancial ﬂows to LIDCs over
three distinct periods: 2003–2007; 2008–2009; and 2010–2012. He concentrates on a sample of 41
countries that excludes fragile states and a number of small island economies. The results presented
suggest that for the period 2003–2007, net debt inﬂows to LIDCs are positively related to GDP growth,
but not in a statistically signiﬁcant way. On the other hand, when this author considers the
overall current account balance, there is stronger evidence of procyclicality of ﬂows (albeit only at
the 10 percent level). Similar results hold for what he denotes the recovery phase covering the period
2010–2012.
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3. Stylized facts
Recently, there has been speculation accompanied with anecdotal evidence that non-FDI private
inﬂows to LIDCs have started to pick up. Some clear events such as international sovereign bond is-
suance by a number of LIDCs have raised the question of the extent to which these countries are gaining,
or in some cases regaining, market access. This would mark an additional development to the rise in
private capital inﬂows driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1990s and 2000s (Dorsey et al.,
2008). Moreover, such events could signal that some LIDCs, the so-called frontier markets, would be
starting to emulate the behavior of emerging market economies.
3.1. A new database on gross capital ﬂows to LIDCs
In this sub-section we brieﬂy present a newly developed database containing information on capital
ﬂows to LIDCs and emerging markets for the period 1990–2014 and discuss some stylized facts. Araujo
et al. (2015) provide a detailed description of the construction of this database with extended LIDCs
coverage.3 The database builds on the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payment Statistics (BOPS),
but also uses relevant information from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database to close
gaps. TheWEO data on capital ﬂows are built from estimates and projections originated by IMF country
desks. Therefore, one signiﬁcant advantage of this dataset is the widespread availability of data across
countries. While in most cases the historical data included in the WEO come from national sources,
economists might adjust them to better reﬂect, among other things, their assessment of the economy,
the nature of ﬁnancial transactions, and related classiﬁcation. Adjustments might also take place to
ensure consistency among the different macroeconomic sectors monitored by country desks.
In particular, WEO data are used to close gaps in the BOPS database whenever historical data from
both sources were found to be consistent for a speciﬁc country. Consistency between WEO and BOPS
data is also used to identify outliers. Whenever possible, auxiliary databases such as the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements (BIS) for international banking statistics, the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research
(EPFR) Global database for equity and bond ﬂows, and Dealogic for external bond issuance are used
to judge the overall trend and presence of events. In the end of the process, the data are cross-
checked in search for big outliers.
A special focus is devoted to non-FDI capital ﬂows. This is related to the fact that a higher share of
FDI in the total ﬂows could be an indication that countries are riskier, less ﬁnancially developed, and
have weaker institutions (Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias, 2001). Firms (functioning as a market sub-
stitute) would rather keep hierarchical control in those markets where transaction costs are high instead
of relying on local suppliers, franchises or other arrangements (in line with Williamson, 1985).
Our measure of interest, non-FDI private inﬂows, is composed of portfolio investment liabilities,
other investment liabilities, and ﬁnancial derivatives but excludes oﬃcial liabilities. For oﬃcial liabili-
ties BOPS does not provide data on inﬂows originated from oﬃcial institutions, hence data on inﬂows
destined for oﬃcial sectors (government and central banks) are used as a proxy. This is standard pro-
cedure in the literature and corroborated by comparison with WEO data (see Dorsey et al., 2008 and
Bluedorn et al., 2013). Greater focus is given to gross ﬂows, since shifts in those might create signif-
icant ﬁnancial vulnerabilities and better capture changes in market access.4
Due to the fact that small and fragile economies usually follow speciﬁc dynamics, we also restrict
our sample to non-fragile and non-small countries.5 After excluding these economies, our dataset on
3 The database is publicly available at http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper. A country classiﬁcation as an LIDC or EM
is based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook country groupings (for details see World Economic Outlook, Statistical
Appendix). Appendix D provides a list of LIDCs and their classiﬁcation as small and/or fragile countries.
4 For a discussion on gross and net ﬂows, see Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011), Broner et al. (2013), Forbes andWarnock (2012)
and Obstfeld (2012).
5 The criteria used to classify small countries follow IMF (2013b). We use the World Bank Deﬁnition of Fragile States as of
2011. The World Bank’s criteria are: (a) a harmonized average Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score of 3.2
or less; (b) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the previous three years.
Araujo et al. (2015) discuss the speciﬁc characteristics of countries within that classiﬁcation.
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gross non-FDI private capital inﬂows covers 66 emerging market countries and 31 LIDCs. Neverthe-
less, the number of countries included in the regressions in subsequent sections of the paper will be
further restricted by data availability for the control variables.
Araujo et al. (2015) show that the share of non-FDI private inﬂows to total ﬂows is increasing in
LIDCs and getting closer to ﬁgures observed in EMs. But, it is worth noting that non-FDI inﬂows to
LIDCs are on average considerably lower than inﬂows to EMs. However, as discussed in Araujo et al.
(2015), inﬂows to the top quartile LIDCs as a share of GDP are found to be comparable to the median
inﬂows in EMs. Moreover, after the global ﬁnancial crisis, inﬂows to the top quartile LIDCs converged
to the top quartile EMs.
3.2. A ﬁrst look at the cyclicality of private capital inﬂows in LIDCs
This sub-section is a ﬁrst pass at assessing the cyclicality of private capital ﬂows in LIDCs by pre-
senting reduced-form correlations between gross private capital inﬂows as a share of trend or “potential”
GDP and the cyclical component of output. We use gross private capital inﬂows, excluding FDI as de-
scribed above from the Araujo et al. (2015) database. Given the limited availability of consistent data
on unemployment and capacity utilization measures for low-income developing countries, we opted
to construct the cyclical component of GDP series using standard univariate ﬁltering techniques. Thus,
we applied the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter to the log of the GDP series at constant 2005 national prices
from version 8.0 of the Penn World Table (see Appendix A for a description of the data and sources)
with a smoothing parameter of 6.25, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data.6
Fig. 1 presents simple correlations at the country level between private capital ﬂows as a share of
trend GDP and the cyclical component of output for several LIDCs and EMs in the period 1990–2011.
The data indicate that the unconditional association tends to be more positive for emerging market
economies (gray bars in the ﬁgure) relative to LIDCs (black bars), thus suggesting that ﬂows are more
procyclical in the former group of countries. The patterns depicted in the ﬁgure remain broadly the
same when alternative ﬁlters are used, namely when we employ a smoothing parameter of 1 for the
HP ﬁlter as suggested by Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) for LIDCs andwhenwe use the Christiano and Fitzger-
ald ﬁlter (results available upon request).
Furthermore, we follow Kaminsky et al. (2005) and compare capital inﬂows as a share of trend GDP
in good and bad times, deﬁned as periods when GDP growth is above or below the median, respec-
tively. The difference between capital inﬂows in good and bad times is denoted the “amplitude” of
capital ﬂows over the domestic business cycle. As Fig. 2 indicates, the amplitude of gross capital ﬂows
is typically positive for both groups of countries, but much wider in EMs relative to LIDCs. In fact, the
median amplitude for LIDCs is close to 0.4, whereas the corresponding number for EMs is 1.2. The
evidence presented in the ﬁgure conﬁrms that capital ﬂows seem procyclical (i.e. tend to be higher
in good times and lower in bad ones), but the decline of capital ﬂows in bad times in EMs is mark-
edly larger than what is observed for LIDCs. These conclusions are broadly in line with the conclusions
of Kaminsky et al. (2005) for a different time period and sample of countries.7
4. Estimation
While the analysis of unconditional correlations allows us to gain some important insights regard-
ing the cyclicality of capital ﬂows to LIDCs, we believe that it is also crucial to control for certain correlates
of capital ﬂows and for time and country ﬁxed-effects in order to isolate the importance of cyclical
ﬂuctuations and facilitate the comparison between EMs and LIDCs given several structural differ-
ences between these country groupings. Our empirical analysis draws on existing studies on the cyclicality
6 Here we choose to focus on the relative magnitudes of inﬂows by normalizing gross private capital inﬂows by trend GDP
as in Broner et al. (2013). Trend GDP is calculated by applying the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter with a parameter of 6.25 to the series
of nominal GDP in U.S. dollars. This approach tends to capture lower frequency movements of capital ﬂows relative to the use
of the cyclical component of capital ﬂows, see Appendix E.
7 But it is important to note that these authors look at net ﬂows rather than gross capital inﬂows.
162 J.D. Araujo et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 70 (2017) 157–182
of capital ﬂows, but also borrows from the literature on the procyclicality of ﬁscal policy in develop-
ing countries (Frankel et al., 2013 and Alesina et al., 2008).
4.1. Estimable equation
In this context, we estimate several versions of the following equation:
cf cf y Xi t i i t i t m m i t
m
M
t i t, , , , , ,= + + + + +−
=
∑α ρ β δ λ1
1
ε (1)
where cfi t, is the private capital ﬂows measure as a share of trend GDP in country i at year t; yi t, is
the cyclical component of GDP; Xm i t, , denotes the control variable m (the set of controls is discussed
further below); αi and λt are country and time ﬁxed-effects, respectively and εi t, is the disturbance
term.
In the baseline speciﬁcations, we use the cyclical component of GDP to assess cyclicality rather
than real GDP growth, because we believe that this variable provides a more direct measure of cycli-
cal movements. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that LIDCs and lower middle-income economies are
likely to be undergoing important structural transformation during the period of analysis and in this
context, the economic concept of “potential output” (as opposed to the statistical estimation of po-
tential or trend output) is not clear-cut. In fact, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) document that in EMs,
shocks to trend growth are the primary source of ﬂuctuations rather than transitory ﬂuctuations around
a stable trend and it is possible that this ﬁnding also applies to LIDCs. We will attempt to disentangle
some of these effects in the robustness section of the paper.
1 Correlations using HP Filter, = 6.25LICs
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Fig. 1. Capital inﬂows and the cyclical component of output (1990–2011).
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Firstly, we estimate the equation by using standard ﬁxed-effects methods with Driscoll and Kraay
(1998) corrected standard errors because of the possible presence of cross-sectional dependence.8 Es-
timators conventionally used in panel data analysis require the assumption of cross-sectional
independence across panel members. In the presence of cross-sectionally correlated error terms, these
methods do not produce consistent estimates of the parameters of interest and can lead to incorrect
inference (Kapetanios et al., 2011). Cross-sectional dependence is likely to arise because of spill-
overs and/or spatial effects among countries or because of the presence of common (unobserved) factors.
In fact, Puy (2013) documents the importance of common global and regional factors in driving bond
and portfolio ﬂows to developing countries.
Nevertheless, a signiﬁcant problem with this framework is that the cyclical component of GDP is
likely to be endogenous to capital ﬂows. In addition, some of the other controls might be highly cor-
related with country ﬁxed effects or could be themselves determined by capital ﬂows. We will attempt
to mitigate these issues by re-estimating the equation using GMM techniques, namely the system
(Blundell–Bond) GMM estimator (see Roodman, 2009 for a discussion), which allows us to handle the
potential endogeneity of some regressors by using lagged values of these variables as instruments.
In addition, we will follow Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) and use trade-partner growth as an external in-
strument for the cyclical component of GDP.
4.2. Control variables
Based on the recent empirical literature on the determinants of capital ﬂows (Broner et al., 2013;
IMF, 2013a; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Franken and van Wijnbergen, 2010; Faria et al., 2007, Puy,
2013, among others), we attempted to identify relevant control variables. These could be roughly par-
titioned into global (“Push”) and country speciﬁc (“Pull”) factors, as it is commonly discussed in the
literature. Moreover, given our focus on the cyclicality of ﬂows, it might also be useful to distinguish
among different sets of controls that account for global cycles (such as the VXO index and the terms
of trade), domestic ﬁnancial cycles (for example, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP), and other
country characteristics (including openness and institutional quality). The list of possible control vari-
ables is long and ultimately, the inclusion of variables in the regressions was dictated by data availability
for a large number of low-income developing countries.
4.2.1. Global factors
Several papers use the VIX or VXO implied volatility index to capture the importance of overall
global economic uncertainty, and/or investor risk appetite in driving capital ﬂows (Forbes andWarnock,
2012). It is also common to include measures of global liquidity as control variables, such that more
liquidity would be associated with increased capital ﬂows in a standard “push” mechanism. Typical
liquidity measures comprise interest rates in advanced economies and a measure of changes in the
global money supply.
Moreover, changes in global commodity prices could also be included as a determinant of the prof-
itability of investments in developing economies (IMF, 2013a). Similarly, there might also be a rationale
to consider changes in the terms of trade, which are likely to add a more country speciﬁc “ﬂavor” rel-
ative to the aggregate commodity prices variable. For most LIDCs it might be reasonable to assume
that terms of trade are mostly driven by exogenous (to the country) factors.
4.2.2. Pull factors
The lagged dependent variable (past capital ﬂows to a speciﬁc country) is included in regressions
to capture herding effects and other departures from fully forward-looking/rational behavior by in-
ternational investors (Franken and van Wijnbergen, 2010). It is also a measure of persistence of ﬂows
and may pick up the effects of omitted control variables. In addition, a number of papers control
for ﬁnancial development/leverage using stock market capitalization as a share of GDP. The main
8 This procedure was implemented in Stata 13 using the code written by Daniel Hoechle from the University of Basel.
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rationale to include this variable is that countries with deeper ﬁnancial systems would attract more
capital ﬂows because of the increased availability of instruments for investment. This indicator typ-
ically is not available for LIDCs, and we use credit to the private sector as a share of GDP as an alternative.
Nevertheless, it is highly likely that stock market capitalization and credit to the private sector are
endogenous to international capital ﬂows and therefore the inclusion of this variable could be prob-
lematic. In fact, Magud et al. (2014) and Frost and van Tilburg (2014) have documented the links between
capital inﬂows and domestic credit.
De jure measures of capital controls/ﬁnancial account openness, such as the ones proposed by Chinn
and Ito (2006), are also widely used, but these measures are also likely to be endogenous. Capital con-
trols may affect capital ﬂows in several ways. Controls on inﬂows constitute a transaction cost, sometimes
prohibitive, that reduces the expected return from investment. Similarly, controls on outﬂows could
be viewed as introducing a real options value (sunk cost) of investing in a country. Capital controls
could also affect the risks of investing in a country. If for example, capital account restrictions are used
to sustain an inconsistent policy mix they would be associated with increases in risk and in the like-
lihood of crises. On the other hand, if capital controls are effectively applied as macroprudential
regulations (for example as “speed limits” on excessive foreign borrowing), they might contribute to
reduce risks.9
Measures of institutional quality and/or country risk are also considered to be important, partic-
ularly because they are a crucial explanatory variable for total factor productivity and also more directly
because they measure the risk of expropriation (Alfaro et al., 2008 and Faria et al., 2007). It is also
common to include proxies for overall macroeconomic stability (such as the inﬂation rate), as in-
creased stability is supposed to improve the attractiveness of a country to international capital inﬂows.
Finally, papers in the literature also include measures of trade openness as a control variable. These
are intended to capture demand for trade ﬁnance and other related ﬁnancial services and/or sensi-
tivity of a country to changes in global demand.
5. Baseline results
In Table 1 we present ﬁxed-effects regressions with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional
dependence for several speciﬁcations of Equation (1). We focus on the link between private capital
ﬂows (excluding FDI) as a share of trend GDP and the cyclical component of output controlling for
a parsimonious set of variables that includes the lagged dependent variable; changes in the VXO
index; de facto trade openness; leverage (private credit to GDP ratio); de jure international ﬁnancial
openness (Chinn–Ito index); changes in the terms of trade and a variable measuring country risk/
institutional quality (the ICRG country risk rating with higher values indicating lower risk/better
institutional quality). Appendix A contains a description of the construction of these variables and the
relevant sources. We exclude small and fragile states from all speciﬁcations presented. We also exclude
Ethiopia from the analysis due to signiﬁcant weaknesses in national accounts statistics (IMF, 2014a).
The results for the ﬁrst four speciﬁcations of Table 1 are in line with the ones obtained in the lit-
erature for broader measures of capital ﬂows focusing on advanced economies and emerging markets
(Broner et al., 2013). The ﬁrst column of the table presents a simple regression for the full sample of
countries (i.e. including both EMs and LIDCs) that includes the lagged dependent variable, the cycli-
cal component of GDP, time and country ﬁxed-effects, but no control variables. The subsequent columns
(speciﬁcations 2, 3, and 4) are implementations of Equation (1) that consider in turn: the full sample
of countries with control variables (speciﬁcation 2), a sample of Emerging Markets exclusively
and no controls (speciﬁcation 3) and a sample of EMs with controls (speciﬁcation 4). The results
strongly indicate that private capital ﬂows are procyclical with β > 0 and statistically signiﬁcant at con-
ventional levels.
Speciﬁcations 5 and 6 are of particular interest for our purposes, since they consider a sample
of LIDCs exclusively. The results continue to point toward procyclical capital ﬂows in this group of
9 There are several possible policy rationales for introducing capital controls as part of the toolkit for capital account man-
agement. A comprehensive exposition of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.
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countries, nevertheless, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient for the cyclical component of GDP is sub-
stantially smaller (0.17 compared to 0.32 for EMs), suggesting that ﬂows to LIDCs are less procyclical.
The regressions also suggest that capital ﬂows are more persistent in LIDCs relative to EMs, since the
coeﬃcients for the lagged dependent variable are higher for the former group of countries (over 0.3
compared to about 0.2 for EMs), as shown in speciﬁcations 3–6 of Table 1. The positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant coeﬃcients obtained for the lagged dependent variable for LIDCs are in line with the
evidence presented by Franken and van Wijnbergen (2010) for the period 1981–2006. This persis-
tence might be a reﬂection of herding behavior by international investors, but could also be partly
explained by omitted control variables. This result could also be seen as evidence of a lagged adjust-
ment in capital ﬂows to its determinants, such that the slower adjustment in LIDCs could be linked
to higher transaction costs in these economies.10
Among the control variables, changes in risk aversion are a signiﬁcant correlate of private capital
ﬂows in all speciﬁcations with the expected sign, but the association between the VXO variable and
capital ﬂows is weaker in LIDCs, as illustrated by the smaller magnitude of the coeﬃcient for this vari-
able in speciﬁcation 6. This result suggests that ﬂows to LIDCs are less sensitive to cycles in global
risk aversion. Trade openness and changes in the terms of trade also present statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients in the LIDC sample (speciﬁcation 6). The terms of trade variable has a negative sign, which
is in line with the results presented in Lane (2015). This author argues that the negative association
between changes in the terms of trade and capital inﬂows could be explained by a crowding out mech-
anism by which export revenues substitute for ﬁnancial inﬂows. Finally, the coeﬃcients for ﬁnancial
openness, leverage, and country risk are not statistically signiﬁcant.
It is possible that the response of capital ﬂows to the cycle might be linked to the size of the banking
sector and to the level of leverage. Typically one would expect that in countries with a smaller banking
sector and lower leverage, the ampliﬁcation effects due to the ﬁnancial accelerator would be less
10 We would like to thank one of the referees for suggesting this interpretation.
Table 1
Fixed effects regressions for private non-FDI capital inﬂows.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Full Full EMs EMs LIDCs LIDCs
Lagged dependent variable 0.236***
[0.077]
0.233***
[0.078]
0.217**
[0.078]
0.211**
[0.080]
0.360***
[0.047]
0.334***
[0.037]
Cyclical component of GDP 0.296**
[0.106]
0.289**
[0.109]
0.313**
[0.124]
0.322**
[0.120]
0.176**
[0.079]
0.170**
[0.080]
Δ(VXO) −2.206***
[0.403]
−2.292***
[0.614]
−0.851***
[0.109]
Trade openness 0.471
[0.729]
0.065
[0.775]
1.407**
[0.638]
Financial openness 0.189
[0.116]
0.224
[0.182]
−0.089
[0.126]
Leverage 0.285
[0.699]
0.544
[0.906]
0.301
[0.486]
Δ(Terms of trade) −1.277
[0.787]
−0.653
[1.439]
−1.945***
[0.668]
ICRG index 0.495
[1.788]
−1.965
[3.171]
0.988
[2.347]
Constant 2.454***
[0.185]
−3.248
[6.837]
3.494***
[0.275]
8.055
[11.741]
0.436***
[0.081]
−10.255
[9.489]
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1327 1327 957 957 370 370
Number of countries 75 75 55 55 20 20
R-2 (within) 0.182 0.185 0.199 0.202 0.220 0.247
Notes: Driscoll–Kraay standard errors in brackets (robust to cross-sectional dependence). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05. Time effects co-
eﬃcients are not reported to save space.
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pronounced. Thus, it would be natural to observe that ﬂows are less procyclical in LIDCs. Moreover,
there might be “practical” reasons associated with the procyclicality of capital ﬂows that might help
to explain differences in the results obtained for LIDCs and EMs. For example, the types of ﬁnancial
instruments that are available to international investors could be a factor in explaining why ﬂows are
less procyclical in LIDCs. LIDCs typically rely more on bank ﬂows and trade ﬁnance, whereas in EMs
cross-border ﬂows take more the form of tradable securities that have asset prices (Lane, 2015), which
are themselves procyclical and thus might lead to rebalancing of portfolios over the cycle.
Overall, based on the results presented in this section, we can conclude that while private capital
ﬂows are procyclical, there is evidence that they are less so in LIDCs. Capital ﬂows to LIDCs also seem
to be more persistent. Furthermore, changes in global risk aversion are an important correlate of capital
ﬂows, but there is evidence that LIDCs are less sensitive to global risk aversion relative to the overall
sample. Finally, it is possible that the differential response of capital ﬂows to the cycle among differ-
ent groups of countries might be linked to the size of the banking sector and to the level of leverage.
6. Robustness checks
In this section, we present some of the extensive robustness exercises that were undertaken. In
particular, we explore alternative estimation methods (system GMM regressions including external
instruments); the presence of risk-on/risk-off regimes driving international capital ﬂows (Lane, 2015);
and we try to disentangle the differential effects of permanent and transitory shocks (Aguiar and
Gopinath, 2007). Furthermore, we also assess whether results change when using alternative control
variables (in particular an index for ﬁnancial development and an index of ﬁnancial reform) and al-
ternative measures of capital ﬂows (for example by adding FDI ﬂows to our measure of private ﬂows
and by estimating regressions with net rather than gross ﬂows).
6.1. GMM regressions
To mitigate possible endogeneity bias for some of our key variables, we re-estimate our models
using the Blundell–Bond system GMM estimator. In addition to the usual inclusion of lagged vari-
ables as instruments (internal instruments), we follow Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) and also include the
contemporaneous and lagged weighted GDP growth of each country’s trading partners as external
instruments.11 We transform instruments using forward orthogonal deviations and present robust stan-
dard errors, which are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We deal
with the bias introduced by high instrument count by collapsing instruments by variable and lag distance.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, contrary to the results previously presented for ﬁxed-
effects estimators, the standard errors obtained using this methodology are not corrected for cross-
sectional dependency, which is only addressed here through the inclusion of time effects. In case time
effects are not suﬃcient to remove cross-sectional dependence, it is possible that the coeﬃcients ob-
tained are inconsistent, thus the results should be interpreted with caution. The results are presented
in Table 2 and overall are in line with the ﬁxed-effects regressions. Private capital ﬂows are positively
associated with the cyclical component of GDP in all speciﬁcations with statistically signiﬁcant co-
eﬃcients (albeit only at the 10 percent level in the speciﬁcation that focuses on LIDCs and includes
control variables). As before, the coeﬃcient for the cyclical component of GDP is smaller for LIDCs,
indicating that procyclicality is weaker in these countries. In addition, the coeﬃcient for the lagged
dependent variable is higher for LIDCs, thus continuing to suggest greater persistence of ﬂows to these
economies or lagged adjustment of ﬂows to determinants due to higher transaction costs. The VXO
continues to be an important control for the full sample of countries and for EMs. In contrast to ﬁxed-
effects results, ﬁnancial openness seems to matter for EMs, but not for LIDCs.
Diagnostic tests are mixed as far as the validity of instruments is concerned, the Hansen test sug-
gests that overidentifying restrictions are valid for all speciﬁcations, but the Sargan test rejects the
11 The series for weighted trade-partner GDP for each country was obtained from the IMF WEO database.
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validity of these restrictions with the exception of speciﬁcation 6, focusing on LIDCs. Nevertheless,
one should bear in mind that the Sargan test statistic is not robust to heteroskedasticity or serial cor-
relation and, in this context, we believe that the Hansen test is more adequate.
6.2. Risk-on, risk-off regimes
Lane (2015) argues that the elasticity of capital ﬂows with respect to country fundamentals varies
with the prevailing conditions in international markets, because of the strong correlation between
the scale of global capital ﬂows and common risk factors. Hence, when analyzing capital ﬂows to LIDCs,
he advocates a strategy of estimating regressions over different cross-sections that would reﬂect these
risk-on/risk-off regimes. We try to address this concern by modeling the “common risk factors” more
explicitly.
The general empirical speciﬁcation followed is summarized in the following equation:
cf y X u
u f
i t i i t mi m i t
m
M
i t
i t i i t i t
, , , , ,
, ,
= + +
= + +
=
∑β δ
α λ
1
ε
(2)
where ft is a common factor that affects all countries and changes over time and is not directly ob-
servable. In the speciﬁcation presented above, we only include one common factor for ease of exposition,
but the speciﬁcation can be extended to include additional common factors. The economic interpre-
tation of the common factors is not straightforward, but in our application, it could be thought of
a way to model the common risk factors referred to by Lane (2015). The error term, εi t, , is assumed
to be white noise. The coeﬃcients associated with the cyclical component of GDP and the control
Table 2
GMM regressions.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Full Full EMs EMs LIDCs LIDCs
Lagged dependent variable 0.316***
[0.064]
0.282***
[0.063]
0.306***
[0.070]
0.272***
[0.071]
0.357***
[0.112]
0.341***
[0.108]
Cyclical component of GDP 0.400***
[0.089]
0.316***
[0.092]
0.439***
[0.110]
0.380***
[0.128]
0.146***
[0.048]
0.144*
[0.072]
Δ(VXO) −2.479**
[1.084]
−3.553**
[1.476]
1.749
[1.837]
Trade openness 2.410*
[1.331]
3.108*
[1.832]
1.216*
[0.640]
Financial openness 0.511*
[0.260]
0.725**
[0.315]
0.011
[0.258]
Leverage 0.173
[0.637]
0.066
[0.770]
0.264
[0.651]
Δ(Terms of trade) −0.804
[1.298]
0.699
[2.252]
−1.264*
[0.725]
ICRG index 8.343
[5.329]
4.601
[7.066]
3.073
[3.998]
Constant 1.286***
[0.464]
−44.791*
[23.916]
1.466**
[0.613]
−31.601
[31.389]
0.792
[0.692]
−18.079
[15.672]
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen test 51.28 49.34 29.97 32.72 0 0
Sargan test 168.6*** 289.4*** 138.9*** 235.3*** 55.99* 144.1
Observations 1248 1248 891 891 357 357
Number of countries 73 73 53 53 20 20
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. Time effects coeﬃcients are not reported to save space. Sargan and Hansen tests of the validity of overidentifying re-
strictions. The Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation.
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variables, as well as the parameter λi (the factor loadings for the common dynamic factor) are allowed
to differ across countries in this speciﬁcation (note that we previously assumed that these coeﬃ-
cients were homogeneous across countries).
The estimation is carried-out using the common correlated effects mean-group (CCEMG) estima-
tor proposed by Pesaran (2006). This estimator uses cross-sectional averages of the dependent and
independent variables as proxies for unobserved common factors in the regressions. The estimator
yields consistent and eﬃcient estimates and its small sample properties do not seem to be affected
by residual serial correlation of the error terms (Kapetanios et al., 2011). The CCEMG estimator also
performs well when variables included in the model are non-stationary.
Nevertheless, the CCEMG approach does not cover the case where the panel includes the lagged
dependent variable. In fact, as discussed in Chudik and Pesaran (2015), the inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable can lead to asymptotically biased CCEMG estimators if certain restrictions are not
met. Therefore, we depart from the baseline speciﬁcation and remove the lagged dependent variable
from these regressions.12
Once again, we ﬁnd that capital ﬂows are procyclical in all speciﬁcations with β > 0 and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at conventional levels (Table 3). But the magnitude of the coeﬃcient for speciﬁcations
that focus on LIDCs (speciﬁcations 5 and 6) is substantially smaller at around 0.21 than the esti-
mated coeﬃcient for EMs, irrespective of whether control variables are included or not.13 The common
dynamic factor linked to capital ﬂows is signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations and its coeﬃcient is larger for
EMs. To sum up, the ﬁnding that market-driven capital ﬂows to LIDCs are less procyclical than private
12 In the working paper version of this article, we reported CCEMG regressions including the lagged dependent variable. While
results for the main variable of interest (the cyclical component of GDP) were in line with the results previously obtained, one
of the referees pointed out that the fact that the coeﬃcient for the lagged dependent variable switched signs across different
speciﬁcations suggested some type of misspeciﬁcation.
13 Estimation was carried out in Stata using the code described in Eberhardt (2012).
Table 3
Regressions with time-variant unobservable factors (CCEMG estimator).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Full Full EMs EMs LIDCs LIDCs
Pesaran (2006) Common correlated effects mean group estimator
Cyclical component of GDP 0.283***
[0.063]
0.373***
[0.102]
0.309***
[0.082]
0.433***
[0.136]
0.213***
[0.068]
0.211**
[0.093]
Δ(VXO) −1.387**
[0.693]
−1.992**
[0.914]
0.248
[0.542]
Trade openness 1.336
[3.211]
0.213
[4.361]
4.377***
[1.598]
Financial openness −1.588
[1.655]
−2.380
[2.224]
0.556
[1.139]
Leverage 3.110*
[1.861]
3.471
[2.486]
2.132
[1.619]
Δ(Terms of trade) 6.013
[6.761]
7.834
[9.241]
1.088
[2.121]
ICRG index 3.228
[6.106]
6.282
[8.057]
−5.034
[5.970]
Common factor linked to capital
ﬂows
0.869***
[0.186]
0.580***
[0.158]
1.096***
[0.244]
0.717***
[0.209]
0.258**
[0.106]
0.210*
[0.116]
Constant 1.383***
[0.439]
−4.089
[31.773]
1.784***
[0.570]
−11.331
[42.076]
0.301
[0.435]
15.505
[31.485]
Root mean-squared error (sigma) 3.492 2.154 3.975 1.011 1.663 1.011
Observations 1228 1228 888 888 340 340
Countries 63 63 46 46 17 17
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Deterministic time trend also included in regressions. Coef-
ﬁcients for other unobservable time-variant common factors are not reported to save space.
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capital ﬂows to emerging markets is robust to approaches taking into account risk-on/risk-off regimes
driving capital ﬂows.
6.3. Capital inﬂows, cyclical ﬂuctuations, and trend shocks
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) show that in EMs, ﬂuctuations at business cycle frequencies are driven
primarily by shocks to trend growth rather than transitory shocks around a stable trend, which char-
acterize advanced economies, i.e. for EMs “the cycle is the trend” in their words. In this sub-section,
we try to disentangle the differential effects of permanent and transitory shocks by adding the growth
in trend-GDP to the right-hand-side of our regressions. The results are presented in Table 4. In all speci-
ﬁcations the cyclical component of GDP continues to present positive and statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients, but the magnitude of this coeﬃcient is smaller for the speciﬁcation that considers LIDCs
exclusively.
Gross private non-FDI capital inﬂows also present a positive and signiﬁcant association with trend
growth in the full sample and in the sample that considers EMs exclusively, suggesting that they are
linked to permanent output shocks as well as temporary ones, but this association is not statistically
signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcations that consider only LIDCs (in fact trend growth presents a negative sign
in these speciﬁcations). Finally, the results for the control variables are in line with those obtained in
the baseline regressions. Overall, we continue to ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant association between
capital inﬂows and the cyclical component of GDP when trend growth is included.
6.4. Alternative control variables and alternative measures of capital ﬂows
We have previously cited a number of studies that highlight a possible link between capital ﬂows
and domestic credit, which would imply the endogeneity of one of the control variables used in our
Table 4
Regressions including trend growth.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Full Full EMs EMs LIDCs LIDCs
Lagged dependent variable 0.236***
[0.077]
0.230***
[0.077]
0.217**
[0.078]
0.205**
[0.078]
0.344***
[0.057]
0.324***
[0.048]
Cyclical component of GDP 0.264**
[0.108]
0.262**
[0.110]
0.277**
[0.125]
0.289**
[0.122]
0.191**
[0.073]
0.182**
[0.074]
Trend growth 0.202***
[0.064]
0.248***
[0.043]
0.221**
[0.089]
0.339***
[0.074]
−0.122
[0.119]
−0.091
[0.125]
Δ(VXO) −1.972***
[0.429]
−2.181***
[0.591]
−0.835***
[0.113]
Trade openness 0.083
[0.692]
−0.880
[0.676]
1.323**
[0.632]
Financial openness 0.188
[0.116]
0.196
[0.175]
−0.113
[0.130]
Leverage 0.620
[0.649]
1.097
[0.814]
0.278
[0.515]
Δ(Terms of trade) −1.498*
[0.828]
−1.040
[1.574]
−1.911**
[0.689]
ICRG index −1.316
[1.613]
−5.437*
[2.855]
0.957
[2.368]
Constant 1.637***
[0.353]
3.755
[5.802]
2.423***
[0.510]
23.611**
[9.672]
0.772**
[0.344]
−9.220
[9.736]
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1327 1327 957 957 370 370
Number of countries 75 75 55 55 20 20
R-2 (within) 0.187 0.191 0.205 0.212 0.224 0.249
Notes: Driscoll–Kraay standard errors in brackets (robust to cross-sectional dependence). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Time
effects coeﬃcients are not reported to save space.
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speciﬁcations to capture the level of leverage or ﬁnancial development, namely the ratio of private
sector credit to GDP. Tomitigate these endogeneity issues, we experiment with speciﬁcations that include
an alternative broad-based ﬁnancial development index proposed by Svirydzenka (2016). The index
covers 183 countries, including several LIDCs, on an annual frequency between 1980 and 2013. It is
composed of eight sub-indexes that summarize how developed ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial
institutions are along three dimensions (depth, access, and eﬃciency) using a large number of indi-
cators. The underlying indicators are normalized and aggregated into sub-indices that are in turn
aggregated into the ﬁnal index.
The results for regressions including these indexes of ﬁnancial development are presented in Table 5.
The aggregate ﬁnancial development index is not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the regressions for
the different country groupings (speciﬁcations 1–3). Nevertheless, when we consider the sub-index
capturing ﬁnancial market depth (size and liquidity of markets), the coeﬃcients obtained are posi-
tive and signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level for the full sample of countries and for the regression focusing
on EMs. But the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant and is also close to zero in magnitude for the speciﬁca-
tion that focuses on LIDCs. These ﬁndings suggest that the size and liquidity of ﬁnancial markets are
particularly relevant for capital ﬂows, but ﬁnancial market depth only seems to matter after a certain
level of development has been reached (note that the average ﬁnancial market depth index is 0.25
for the EM country group and only 0.11 for the LIDC group). We also estimated regressions including
the ﬁnancial institutions development sub-index as a control variable, but this variable is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant and the results are very similar to the ones obtained for the regressions that include
the aggregate ﬁnancial development index. These results are not presented to save space, but are avail-
able from the authors upon request.
Crucially, the coeﬃcients for the main variable of interest in this paper, the cyclical component of
GDP, are very close in magnitude to the ones obtained in the baseline speciﬁcation for the regres-
sions that focus on LIDCs exclusively and somewhat larger than the baseline for the speciﬁcations that
focus exclusively on EMs (the statistical signiﬁcance levels are identical to the baseline regressions
for both country groups). Therefore, the initial conclusions are reinforced by the use of these alter-
native control variables (aggregate ﬁnancial development index and sub-indexes); capital ﬂows to LIDCs
are procyclical, but are considerably less so than ﬂows to more advanced economies.
Moreover, to further explore the role of the ﬁnancial sector, we include in our regressions the index
of ﬁnancial reforms constructed by Abiad et al. (2010). Unfortunately, the limited data availability of
this index reduces the LIDC sample to only 13 countries and, on the time dimension, the data on ﬁ-
nancial reforms only cover the years up to 2005.
Speciﬁcations 7–9 in Table 5 show the results obtained when we include the ﬁnancial reform
index in the baseline regressions. We exclude the ﬁnancial openness variable because external
ﬁnancial openness is a component of the overall ﬁnancial reform index. We also exclude the VXO
from this speciﬁcation because of the more limited time dimension, which impedes us to estimate
the coeﬃcient for this variable (that only presents time variation). It is interesting to note that the
coeﬃcient for the ﬁnancial reform index is signiﬁcant and positive for the overall sample and for the
sample that includes EMs exclusively, but not for the sample that focuses on LIDCs. The results
previously reported regarding the cyclical component of GDP still hold, but the coeﬃcient for the
cyclical component of GDP in the speciﬁcation that focuses on LIDCs exclusively is no longer statis-
tically signiﬁcant.
In addition, to further check the robustness of our results, we also estimate the baseline regres-
sions using alternative measures of capital ﬂows as the left-hand-side variable. The results are presented
in Table 6. We consider ﬁrst speciﬁcations that include only gross FDI ﬂows on the left-hand-side (speci-
ﬁcations 1 and 2). These ﬂows had been excluded from the original measure of private ﬂows presented
in previous sections. In this case, the coeﬃcient for the cyclical component of GDP is not statistically
signiﬁcant both for the full sample and LIDC country group. The lagged dependent variable contin-
ues to be signiﬁcant and positive in all speciﬁcations with large coeﬃcients relative to the baseline.
These results suggest that foreign direct investment is more persistent and less related to the cycle
than private non-FDI ﬂows. When we add FDI inﬂows to our measure of private capital ﬂows (speci-
ﬁcations 3 and 4), the coeﬃcients for the cyclical component of GDP and for the lagged dependent
variable present larger magnitudes in LIDCs relative to the baseline speciﬁcation.
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Table 5
Regressions including the ﬁnancial development and the ﬁnancial reform indexes.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Full EMs LIDCs Full EMs LIDCs Full EMs LIDCs
Lagged dependent variable 0.244***
[0.072]
0.231***
[0.076]
0.339***
[0.038]
0.244***
[0.072]
0.230***
[0.075]
0.338***
[0.037]
0.165*
[0.086]
0.125
[0.089]
0.333***
[0.072]
Cyclical component of GDP 0.313**
[0.125]
0.349**
[0.137]
0.166**
[0.076]
0.321**
[0.125]
0.361**
[0.136]
0.164**
[0.076]
0.269***
[0.062]
0.323***
[0.077]
0.084
[0.093]
Financial development index 6.232 7.762 3.625
Financial market depth index [3.857] [4.787] [4.208] 4.961**
[2.180]
5.756**
[2.510]
1.012
[3.606]
Financial reform index 0.472***
[0.116]
0.592***
[0.140]
0.090
[0.119]
Δ(VXO) −2.272***
[0.429]
−2.887***
[0.511]
−0.830***
[0.141]
−2.082***
[0.406]
−2.602***
[0.527]
−0.773***
[0.159]
Trade openness 0.244
[0.632]
−0.455
[0.720]
1.273*
[0.614]
0.274
[0.647]
−0.379
[0.750]
1.335**
[0.600]
−1.175
[1.025]
−2.718**
[1.151]
1.267
[1.021]
Financial openness 0.036
[0.180]
0.078
[0.248]
−0.062
[0.120]
0.055
[0.179]
0.109
[0.246]
−0.053
[0.126]
Leverage 0.557
[0.608]
1.045
[0.806]
−0.161
[0.579]
Δ(Terms of trade) −0.660
[0.946]
0.040
[1.572]
−1.856***
[0.644]
−0.592
[0.945]
0.175
[1.564]
−1.863***
[0.654]
−3.409***
[1.062]
−5.051**
[1.905]
−2.035**
[0.784]
ICRG index 0.527
[1.835]
−2.113
[3.370]
0.848
[2.095]
0.687
[1.809]
−2.051
[3.256]
0.987
[2.064]
−0.344
[2.803]
−3.594
[4.049]
2.417
[2.743]
Constant −3.212
[8.203]
10.602
[14.501]
−8.727
[9.127]
−3.255
[8.099]
11.149
[14.351]
−9.165
[8.926]
0.000
[0.000]
0.000
[0.000]
−15.009
[12.299]
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1427 1052 375 1427 1052 375 709 535 174
Number of countries 75 55 20 75 55 20 53 40 13
R-2 (within) 0.189 0.203 0.246 0.191 0.205 0.245 0.210 0.250 0.258
Notes: Driscoll–Kraay standard errors in brackets (robust to cross-sectional dependence). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Time effects coeﬃcients are not reported to save space.
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Moreover, we also estimated speciﬁcations with net capital ﬂows (excluding FDI ﬂows) as the de-
pendent variable (speciﬁcations 5 and 6), adding portfolio assets and other investment assets to our
measure of non-FDI private ﬂows. The results suggest that net ﬂows are less related to the cycle, as
the coeﬃcients obtained are positive, but not signiﬁcant.
7. Conclusions
By the second half of the 2000s, several LIDCs were experiencing increased non-FDI private inﬂows.
Moreover, inﬂows to a number of these economies started to exhibit similar patterns and character-
istics to inﬂows to emerging markets. Indeed, a number of LIDCs experienced surges in non-FDI inﬂows
in the period 2004–2008, evidence that LIDCs were “catching the wave” of the general increase in ﬂows
to developing countries in that period.
Motivated by these facts, we examined the cyclicality of private non-FDI capital inﬂows to low-
income developing countries. We ﬁnd that market-driven capital inﬂows to LIDCs are typically less
procyclical and more persistent than capital inﬂows to emerging markets. To our knowledge this is
the ﬁrst paper to quantify this differentiated response of capital ﬂows to the cycle across groups of
non-advanced economies. We also show that changes in risk aversion are a signiﬁcant correlate of
private capital inﬂows, but LIDCs seem to be less sensitive to changes in global risk aversion than EMs.
These conclusions are robust to different estimation methods and control variables.
The ﬁndings indicate that private capital inﬂows are likely to become more procyclical as LIDCs
develop, which could render the conduct of countercyclical monetary and ﬁscal policies more diﬃ-
cult in these economies. For example, capital inﬂow reversals linked to domestic recessions could lead
to pressures for currency depreciation andmonetary policy tightening to defend the currency (to contain
exchange rate pass-through or mitigate balance sheet effects), therefore exacerbating the economic
downturn in the capital receiving economy (Vegh and Vuletin, 2012 discuss these mechanisms in the
Table 6
Alternative measures of capital ﬂows.
Gross FDI Gross (private + FDI) Net ﬂows (excl. FDI)
1 2 3 4 5 6
LIDCs Full LIDCs Full LIDCs Full
Lagged dependent variable 0.709***
[0.064]
0.700***
[0.053]
0.511***
[0.054]
0.419***
[0.082]
0.293***
[0.051]
0.311***
[0.022]
Output gap 0.132
[0.078]
0.020
[0.028]
0.318**
[0.137]
0.311**
[0.118]
0.129
[0.146]
0.152
[0.103]
Δ(VXO) 0.803***
[0.122]
0.046
[0.216]
0.279
[0.258]
−2.169***
[0.742]
0.160
[0.206]
−0.514*
[0.267]
Trade openness 1.073
[0.738]
1.293**
[0.537]
2.174
[1.404]
2.056
[1.206]
1.479
[0.952]
1.906*
[0.934]
Financial openness −0.242
[0.207]
0.241
[0.191]
−0.356*
[0.187]
0.531**
[0.249]
−0.164
[0.219]
0.253*
[0.127]
Leverage 0.727
[0.465]
0.289
[0.292]
1.239
[0.750]
0.493
[0.741]
0.557
[0.694]
−0.291
[0.442]
Δ(Terms of trade) 0.271
[0.824]
−0.049
[0.511]
−1.601
[0.978]
−1.207
[0.835]
−3.372***
[0.979]
−5.590***
[1.373]
ICRG index 1.994
[1.699]
1.790
[1.337]
2.850
[2.088]
2.108
[2.626]
−1.976
[2.447]
1.358
[2.039]
Constant −13.648
[8.755]
−12.455**
[5.595]
−22.483**
[9.029]
−15.372
[10.674]
0.785
[10.994]
−13.676
[8.013]
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 370 1316 369 1315 359 1312
Number of countries 20 75 20 75 20 75
R-2 (within) 0.541 0.509 0.466 0.329 0.206 0.335
Notes: Driscoll–Kraay standard errors in brackets (robust to cross-sectional dependence). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Time
effects coeﬃcients are not reported to save space.
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context of what they call “fear of free falling”). These interactions between procyclical capital ﬂows
and policies are particularly challenging for LIDCs, which are characterized by evolving policy frame-
works where credibility is still being built slowly over time.
Consequently, policies to manage capital inﬂows and mitigate the destabilizing effects linked to
procyclicality might become more relevant for these countries (see Ostry et al., 2012 for a discussion
of the prudential toolkit to manage ﬁnancial stability risks from capital ﬂows). Procyclical and vola-
tile capital ﬂows also pose challenges to traditionalmonetary policy frameworks in LIDCs that are typically
based on targets for the growth rate of monetary aggregates. The instability and unpredictability of
monetary aggregates reﬂect to a large extent high volatility of reserve money, which is linked to capital
ﬂows. This reinforces the need to accelerate the process of moving toward modern forward-looking
policy frameworks in these countries (IMF, 2014b).
An important avenue for future research would be to identify the precise mechanisms that are driving
the results presented in this paper. We suggested that the response of capital ﬂows to the cycle might
be linked to the size of the banking sector and to the level of leverage in the economy. As LIDCs typ-
ically have smaller banking sector and lower leverage, the ampliﬁcation effects due to the ﬁnancial
accelerator would be less pronounced. The types of ﬁnancial instruments that are available to inter-
national investors could also be a factor in explaining why ﬂows are less procyclical in LIDCs.
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Appendix A. Description of selected variables
Variable Description Sources
Capital ﬂows Private capital ﬂows (excluding FDI) as a share of trend
GDP. Both variables are denominated in US dollars.
See main text.
VXO index Implied volatility index on the S&P 500. Calculated by
Chicago Board Options Exchange.
Haver Analytics
Trade openness Sum of exports and imports divided by GDP WEO database
Terms of trade Log of terms of trade index WEO database
Country risk/political instability Log of ICRG composite risk ratings ICRG
Financial account openness Chinn–Ito kaopen index, which is based on data from the
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions
Chinn and Ito (2006)
Real GDP Real GDP at constant 2005 national prices (rgdpna series) Penn World Table, Version
8.0. Feenstra et al. (2013).
Cyclical component of GDP Cyclical component of the log of the Real GDP series using
the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter. The ﬁlter was estimated over
the entire period for which the GDP data are available in
the PWT dataset.
Authors’ calculations
Leverage Private credit to GDP ratio (missing values were
interpolated)
Global Financial
Development Database.
Cihak et al. (2012).
Appendix B. Descriptive statistics for selected variables
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Observations
(Capital ﬂows)/(trend output) Overall 2.133 5.518 −36.783 69.426 N = 2182
Between 2.520 −6.391 12.336 n = 94
Within 4.942 −36.990 68.367 T-bar = 23.2128
Cyclical component of GDP Overall −0.039 3.363 −46.754 22.375 N = 1951
Between 0.216 −1.435 0.374 n = 89
Within 3.356 −45.358 22.737 T = 21.9213
ΔLog of VXO index Overall −0.013 0.261 −0.442 0.684 N = 2059
Between 0.005 −0.013 0.016 n = 94
Within 0.261 −0.471 0.685 T = 21.9043
Trade openness Overall 4.251 0.492 2.581 6.696 N = 2110
Between 0.434 3.018 5.212 n = 94
Within 0.233 3.050 6.542 T = 22.4468
Capital account openness Overall 0.034 1.468 −1.889 2.390 N = 2091
Between 1.245 −1.889 2.390 n = 95
Within 0.825 −3.711 2.599 T = 22.0105
Leverage Overall 2.943 0.874 −2.161 5.111 N = 1749
Between 0.756 1.373 4.679 n = 92
Within 0.461 −1.136 4.890 T = 19.0109
ΔTerms of Trade Overall 0.008 0.135 −0.887 1.641 N = 1956
Between 0.030 −0.083 0.086 n = 93
Within 0.132 −0.838 1.589 T = 21.0323
ICRG country risk Overall 4.184 0.144 3.212 4.490 N = 1819
Between 0.101 3.911 4.464 n = 83
Within 0.101 3.390 4.451 T = 21.9157
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Appendix C. Descriptive statistics for non-small non-fragile LIDCs
Country Variable Obs. Max Min Mean Std. dev.
Bangladesh Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 1.47 −0.09 0.37 0.40
Cyclical component of GDP 22 0.86 −0.62 0.04 0.34
Benin Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 24 6.56 −1.78 2.40 2.13
Cyclical component of GDP 22 1.81 −2.42 −0.05 0.92
Bolivia Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 4.86 −3.53 0.87 2.15
Cyclical component of GDP 22 2.32 −1.00 0.09 0.84
Burkina Faso Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 18 3.78 −1.44 0.73 1.45
Cyclical component of GDP 22 2.94 −3.12 −0.08 1.65
Cambodia Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 23 10.60 −0.68 2.29 2.59
Cyclical component of GDP 22 3.33 −2.88 −0.21 1.79
Cameroon Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 24 5.01 −3.99 0.31 2.13
Cyclical component of GDP 22 1.42 −2.83 −0.04 1.00
Gambia, The Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 18 1.50 −9.06 −2.38 3.71
Cyclical component of GDP 22 3.69 −2.24 0.03 1.51
Ghana Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 6.04 −1.96 0.72 1.69
Cyclical component of GDP 22 3.23 −2.70 −0.02 1.04
Honduras Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 5.62 −4.93 0.64 2.19
Cyclical component of GDP 22 2.99 −2.45 −0.07 1.60
Kenya Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 9.96 −0.83 3.67 2.74
Cyclical component of GDP 22 2.90 −2.38 0.01 1.40
Kyrgyz Republic Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 22 20.22 −4.87 3.64 5.65
Cyclical component of GDP 22 5.80 −10.56 0.00 4.18
Lao People’s Dem. Rep Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 24 3.75 −1.07 0.93 1.19
Cyclical component of GDP 22 1.93 −1.01 0.10 0.65
Lesotho Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 7.49 −1.42 0.73 1.84
Cyclical component of GDP 22 1.56 −1.25 0.05 0.87
Madagascar Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 24 7.24 −0.72 0.80 2.11
Cyclical component of GDP 22 6.70 −8.62 0.00 3.11
Malawi Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 3.86 −4.68 0.92 1.53
Cyclical component of GDP 22 6.26 −9.00 0.12 3.67
Mali Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 24 4.24 −1.07 1.03 1.38
Cyclical component of GDP 22 2.78 −5.20 −0.07 1.84
Mauritania Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 7.19 −36.78 −6.39 10.32
Cyclical component of GDP 22 8.37 −3.47 −0.11 3.10
Moldova Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 21 15.61 −2.06 5.55 4.51
Cyclical component of GDP 22 8.79 −12.56 0.00 4.66
Mongolia Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 25.36 −3.89 2.78 5.67
Cyclical component of GDP 22 5.63 −6.14 −0.21 3.19
Mozambique Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 7.26 −2.92 1.38 2.71
Cyclical component of GDP 22 3.79 −5.12 −0.01 2.24
Niger Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 24 4.56 −4.51 0.61 2.07
Cyclical component of GDP 22 4.91 −3.73 −0.04 2.05
Nigeria Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 6.42 −4.03 1.08 2.64
Cyclical component of GDP 22 6.76 −5.64 0.37 2.74
Rwanda Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 2.72 −2.43 0.20 1.15
Cyclical component of GDP 22 17.39 −40.87 0.12 10.84
Senegal Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 8.26 −2.36 2.55 2.79
Cyclical component of GDP 22 1.87 −2.70 −0.02 1.22
Tanzania Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 3.27 −0.91 0.89 1.17
Cyclical component of GDP 22 1.01 −0.66 0.04 0.42
Uganda Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 2.88 −1.28 0.39 1.09
Cyclical component of GDP 22 2.67 −2.06 0.02 1.25
Uzbekistan Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 23 2.87 −5.57 −0.46 2.06
Cyclical component of GDP 22 4.87 −2.57 0.00 1.59
Vietnam Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 19 11.05 0.07 2.72 2.53
Cyclical component of GDP 22 1.90 −1.48 −0.05 0.86
Zambia Capital ﬂows/trend GDP 25 6.88 −2.64 2.25 2.53
Cyclical component of GDP 22 5.57 −4.80 −0.01 1.91
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Appendix D. List of LIDCs and classiﬁcation
Country Classiﬁcation Country Classiﬁcation
Afghanistan, I.R. of Fragile Liberia Fragile
Bangladesh Madagascar
Benin Malawi
Bhutan Small Mali
Bolivia Mauritania
Burkina Faso Moldova
Burundi Fragile Mongolia
Cambodia Mozambique
Cameroon Myanmar Fragile
Central African Rep. Fragile Nepal Fragile
Chad Fragile Nicaragua
Comoros Fragile Small Niger
Congo, Dem. Rep. of Fragile Nigeria
Congo, Republic of Fragile Papua New Guinea
Côte d’Ivoire Fragile Rwanda
Djibouti Small São Tomé & Príncipe Fragile Small
Eritrea Fragile Senegal
Ethiopia Sierra Leone Fragile
Gambia, The Solomon Islands Fragile Small
Ghana Sudan Fragile
Guinea Fragile Tajikistan Fragile
Guinea-Bissau Fragile Tanzania
Haiti Fragile Togo Fragile
Honduras Uganda
Kenya Uzbekistan
Kiribati Fragile Small Vietnam
Kyrgyz Republic Yemen, Republic of Fragile
Lao People’s Dem. Rep Zambia
Lesotho Zimbabwe Fragile
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Appendix E. Detrending gross capital inﬂows
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